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Abstract: Thailand’s politics in the early 21st century has seen considerable contestation. 
Underlying the street protests, military interventions and considerable bloodshed has been a 
struggle over the nature of electoral politics, popular sovereignty and representation. The 
military and monarchy have maintained a royalist alliance that opposes elections, popular 
sovereignty and civilian politicians, proposing “Thai-style democracy” as an alternative. 
Those who promote elections and popular sovereignty argue that these are a basis for 
democratisation. 
 
 
On May 22, 2014, Thailand’s military staged yet another coup, unseating the 
government elected in 2011, led by Yingluck Shinawatra. By most calculations, this was 
Thailand’s 12th successful coup. The 11th putsch in September 2006 ousted Yingluck’s 
brother, Thaksin Shinawatra. 
In considering these two most recent military interventions, it is striking that both were 
associated with a decade of large and sometimes aggressive street protests. As will be shown 
in this paper, at the core of these demonstrations have been competing ideas about 
democracy, elections and representation. Involving a range of actors, the most significant of 
the street protests have, on the one hand, been associated with the red-shirted supporters of 
Thaksin and, on the other hand, by their opponents, known as yellow shirts and more broadly 
identified – and self-identified – as royalists. Both groups have mobilized large numbers of 
supporters. 
If the leaders of Thailand’s competing political groups had ever thought to peruse the 
pages of this journal, they would have found much that resonated with their struggles and 
debates of the past decade. Indeed, the Electoral Reform Society (ERS) might have been 
claimed as something of a model by Thailand’s most recent protesters, the “People's 
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Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State” (PCAD). The PCAD 
argued that what they wanted was thorough-going political reform, and so its leaders might 
have agreed with the ERS view that “the present electoral system has little to recommend 
it…”. PCAD activists rejected Thailand’s electoral system and opposed voting because these 
were considered obstacles for political reform. They would have noticed resonance with their 
own rhetoric when the ERS pointed to injustices associated with electoral minorities, and the 
PCAD would have been heartened to read that the British electoral system was sometimes 
described as “undemocratic,” a term the PCAD regularly used in criticising Yingluck’s 
government (Electoral Reform Society, 1970: 1). They would also have noticed that at times 
the ERS questioned electoral mandates, for the PCAD consistently rejected the substantial 
election victory voters delivered for Yingluck in 2011 (Electoral Reform Society, 1971: 3). 
At the same time, Yingluck’s Pheu Thai Party government and its supporters in the 
“United Democratic Front Against Dictatorship” (UDD), would certainly have agreed with a 
1970 ERS article that lamented the “tendency to substitute various forms of demonstration 
for the ballot box…” (Electoral Reform Society, 1970: 1). They would have recognised the 
sentiment expressed in the article, “Let the voters arbitrate,” by the ERS’s “EL” (1975: 37); 
after all, as the PCAD rallied to bring down the Yingluck government and prevented an 
election, her supporters repeatedly demanded that their votes and their right to vote be 
respected. 
In other words, even if the methods and outcomes may be quite different from those 
seen in Britain of the 1970s, the contested claims about the nature of electoral politics and 
about appropriate forms of representation are familiar in early 21st century Thailand. In this 
paper, the history and development of these competing claims will be examined. This 
historical contextualisation of Thailand’s debates over representation is critical in 
understanding the nature of the past decade of intense political conflict, from 2005 to 2014. 
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This recent period has seen seven prime ministers and was punctuated by two military 
coups. It is a conflict that has been destructive and divisive and has thrown competing claims 
about political representation into stark relief. In established democracies, the nature of this 
representation is sometimes contested but it seldom threatens a political regime. In Thailand, 
contestation over representation has led to violence, military intervention and deep political 
division. These struggles over representation have been about the very nature of the political 
order in Thailand. 
 
Constitutionalism, representation and Thai-style democracy 
 
The struggles over representation in Thailand first developed in the decade or so prior 
to the 1932 rebellion that replaced the absolute monarchy with a constitutional regime. 
Initially, the monarchy was able to manage the calls for change and democracy. However, in 
1932, it was pushed aside. The 1932 rebels proclaimed themselves the People’s Party, and 
their first announcement was addressed to “All the people.” The notion that the rebellion was 
by and for the common people was, of itself, a radical political statement in early 20th century 
Thailand. 
The announcement began by pointing to corruption, cronyism and the lack of 
representation under the monarchy, stating that the king was not “listening to the voice of the 
people.” The announcement made a case for popular sovereignty: “You, all of the people, 
should know that our country belongs to the people – not to the king…” and promised a 
constitutional regime and “government by an assembly…”, suggesting a movement towards 
an electoral democracy. In establishing the new regime, the People’s Party also promised 
equal rights, liberty and freedom (People’s Party, 2000: 70-72). In a context where the 
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monarchy had ruled without constitution, representatives and legislature, the People’s Party 
envisioned radical political arrangements.  
The People’s Party announcement set a tone that was to colour all of the political 
struggles of the past eight decades. Some of these challenges involved competing elites, most 
notably the competition between royalists who preferred narrow and hierarchical conceptions 
of representation, and those who favoured civilian and electoral regimes. At the same time, 
these elite scraps have occurred in a context of broader struggles involving non-elites. In the 
past three decades, there has been intense political activism as Thailand has lurched from one 
coup to another and as five interim and “permanent” constitutions have come and gone. Most 
recently, this contestation has seen considerable mobilisation that has sometimes resulted in 
bloodshed.  
When the monarchy was overthrown in 1932, it was not defeated. Royalists re-grouped 
to become a political force, opposing the new constitutional regime. In a context of political 
plotting and rebellion, the People’s Party statements on representative government failed to 
match its initial radicalism and there was a drift to military interventionism.  
The first 1932 Constitution was marked “draft” by the king when it was presented to 
him by the People’s Party. It was a radical charter in that it created a wholly appointed 
unicameral legislature of 70 members. This appointed assembly first met on 28 June 1932, 
less than a week after the People’s Party seized power, and scheduled elections for late 1933. 
However, compromises were already underway with royalists and the monarchy. Under the 
“permanent” constitution of 1932, a fully-elected assembly was promised, but transitory 
arrangements were introduced that meant there would be 78 indirectly elected and 78 
appointed members. The first direct elections were not held until November 1937 and the 
National Assembly remained half-appointed until after World War 2 (see Albritton and 
Thawilwadee 2004: 6). 
5 
 
The failure of the People’s Party government to establish a fully representative 
parliament owed much to intense political conflict of the period. The 1932 overthrow of the 
monarchy is sometimes analysed as an elite coup (see Chambers, 2013: 119). However, this 
description ignores the considerable unrest and widespread dissatisfaction with royal 
absolutism that was seen in the period that led up to the People’s Party intervention and 
which was compounded by the impact of the Great Depression. It also tends to miss the 
considerable public support for the People’s Party (see Nakkarin, 1992; Hewison, 1986). 
Evidence for this popular backing was seen in 1933 when royalists destabilised the new 
regime through bureaucratic machinations, and then launched a military rebellion. The 
rebellion was beaten but saw the defeated royalists become involved a series of plots meant 
to undermine the People’s Party, its government and derail the political changes it promoted 
(Nattapoll, 2010). Under pressure from the royalists, regime maintenance became critical, 
and this resulted in the military faction of the People’s Party, led by Field Marshal Phibun 
Songkhran, gaining greatest influence. The result was limited and often only rhetorical 
support for electoral politics for another decade. 
For a brief moment following the war, electoral democracy and a fully-elected 
Assembly seemed possible. Elections were held in January 1946 and while political parties 
were not officially permitted to contest it, new political parties were formed, including the 
royalist Democrat Party (Thompson, 1948). Soon after, in May, a new constitution was 
signed into law by the young King Ananda Mahidol. Associated with Pridi Banomyong’s 
civilian remnants of the People’s Party, the new charter provided for a fully elected House of 
Representatives and a Senate that was chosen by the elected House. Pridi, considered a 
republican by royalists, was soon ousted by royalists who blamed him for the unexplained 
gunshot death of King Ananda in June 1946 (Pasuk and Baker, 1995: 266-269). The outcome 
of Pridi’s ouster was that the royalists gained the political upper hand, with the November 
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1947 military coup leading to the arrest of dissident parliamentarians by the military. The 
coup group immediately abrogated the 1946 constitution, replacing it with a royalist-inspired 
charter that returned significant powers to the king, with the upper house was to be wholly 
appointed by the monarch. Elections were held for the lower house, and not unexpectedly 
resulted in a victory for the royalist Democrat Party. However, the Democrat premier was 
soon forced out by the military and further constitutional changes in 1949 moved more power 
into the hands of the military and monarchy (Harding and Leyland, 2011: 14-17). Reacting to 
demonstrations organised with the support of parliamentarians based in the Northeast who 
were seeking greater representation and challenging the military, another military coup 
eventuated in 1951. Political meetings were banned, as were political parties, parliament was 
dissolved, and the constitution abrogated (Pasuk and Baker, 1995: 270). 
Despite these military interventions and considerable repression, the early 1950s was 
also a period of significant political agitation, much of it driven by a desire for representative 
politics to be promoted. The impetus for this agitation came from both domestic contestation 
and international changes following the Chinese Revolution and the outbreak of the Korean 
War (see Hewison and Rodan, 2012). The military’s response was to crack down on those it 
identified as “separatists” and “communists,” and as political alliances waxed and waned, 
tussles between police and military leaders saw Phibun dump the royalists, re-establish a 
1932-like constitution and seek an electoral mandate. The resulting 1957 elections were a 
significant contest, but claims that Phibun’s party engaged in election-rigging resulted in 
General Sarit Thanarat and his royalist allies overthrowing Phibun in yet another coup.  
Essentially, this military intervention and the widespread repression that was instituted 
by Sarit forcefully took open discussions of representation off the political agenda. An ardent 
royalist, Sarit used the monarchy and the young king to bolster his legitimacy and developed 
ideologies – “Thai-style democracy” and the related notion of “Thainess” – that linked the 
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monarchy and military in a political position that rejected liberalism and electoral 
representation (Connors, 2007). Sarit’s repression and his need for a legitimacy distinct from 
previous regimes revolved around a revival of the monarchy that continued, essentially 
uninterrupted, to the 2000s.  
Sarit and successor military regimes gained strong Western support as an ally of the 
U.S. during the Cold War while anti-communism was a convenient excuse for the repression 
of political opponents. One result was that political liberals who favoured electoral 
representation were silenced and political opposition developed a harder edge as the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) launched a “people’s war.” While a parliament was in 
place for for some periods in the 1960s, it counted for nothing, dominated by the military and 
thrown aside whenever the military decided it needed total control. Likewise, constitutional 
rule was rejected by military leaders, and interim and new constitutions were treated with 
contempt. Much of this was justified in terms of a unique “Thai-style democracy” (Hewison 
and Kengkij 2010). 
 
Thai-style democracy 
 
Referred to in Thai as prachathippatai baep thai, Thai-style democracy developed from 
a belief that there can be a Thai-style of government (kan pokkhrong baep thai). It was the 
royalist politician and minor prince Kukrit Pramoj who developed these ideas during Sarit’s 
period, reflecting the nature of his dictatorial regime.1 Kukrit and other royalists supported 
                                                 
1 Connors (2011: 668) prefers to view Kukrit as a “hybrid liberal-conservative” and suggests “Kukrit went to 
work with the sole intent of bringing the monarchy into its own.” His view is that Kukrit sought to “position … 
the monarchy at the apex of the political system, thus seeking to reverse praetorian tendencies.” Unfortunately, 
the available evidence is that Kukrit maintained a perspective that there was an essential link between military 
and monarchy (see Kukrit, 1983: 75). Connors (2008) makes a broader claim for a “liberal royalism” that seeks 
to develop liberal political institutions tied to the monarchy. Such a project makes some political sense, although 
the events of 2006-14 would suggest that the model project was flawed and that the “liberals” willingly ceded 
their political space to anti-democrats and the military. 
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the monarchy and considered that constitutional constraints on the monarch were 
inappropriate in Thailand. When Sarit came to power and promoted the monarchy, his regime 
effectively made the king sovereign, in place of the previous constitutional conception that 
the people were sovereign (Kobkua, 2003: 57; see also Borwornsak, n.d.: 2). 
The essential claim of this political philosophy is that “Western-style democracy” was 
prematurely transplanted to a Thailand that was culturally different from the West; for 
democracy to be successful, it needed to be “Thai-style.” This philosophy holds that Thailand 
is amenable to strong leadership and hierarchical organisation and asserts that a moral and 
strong leader who promotes national unity is best for the country and its people (Thak, 2007: 
100-6). Representation was defined in these hierarchical and paternalistic terms where a 
father-leader would visit his “children” – the people – to learn of their needs and then initiate 
appropriate policy to meet these needs. This approach was considered superior to the “chaos” 
that was identified as resulting from electoral politics. It was in this context that Sarit’s 
despotic regime could proclaim itself “democratic” in a Thai political and cultural context 
and could dispense with “divisive” elections and a constitution (Thak, 2007: xiii). Kukrit, 
who supported Sarit and his use of dictatorial powers, argued that a military regime led by a 
“good” man was morally superior to being governed by elected but self-interested politicians 
(Saichol, 2007: 69). Kukrit justified military rule and the use of the putsch more broadly, 
arguing that these were necessary for the elimination of “bad” politicians and “chaotic” 
parliamentary politics. For Kukrit, it was only the military that, in alliance with the 
monarchy, that could deliver national unity and political stability. In this royalist perspective, 
the military coup became a mechanism for eliminating governments that lacked the 
appropriate moral leadership (see Saichol, 2007: 32-9, 54). In the royalist account of 
Thailand’s political history, this perspective was transformed into a generalised rejection of 
electoral politics and civilian politicians as chaotic and corrupt (Thongchai, 2008). 
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This attention to moral leadership enabled Kukrit to establish the significance of 
connection between military leadership and the monarch. As unimpeachably moral, the king 
operated as a watchdog over government, maintaining the nation’s and the people’s best 
interests. Kukrit defined a “good” political leader in moral terms tying this to loyalty to the 
king and a duty to protect the monarchy, making military leaders the best-placed examples of 
such a loyal leader under the moral guidance of the king (Saichol, 2007: 40-65). In this 
philosophy, representation was linked directly with the hereditary monarchy which was able 
to determine the best interests of the people. 
The long period of military interventionism and the alliance of Sarit’s regime with the 
palace and the royalist political faction established Thai-style democracy as the dominant 
political model, displacing and restricting more liberal, representative and democratic 
political alternatives.  
Thai-style democracy with the monarchy central to politics as a “moral” force and the 
military as its “protector” was essential for the longevity of military rule. The monarchy had 
played a critical ideological role for the military regime that made the war against the CPT a 
battle for the trilogy of “nation, religion and monarchy” considered “sacred.” The regime’s 
political model conceptualised elected politicians as self-interested, self-serving and lacking 
the necessary virtue to rule; allowing them to rule threatened the national trilogy. This 
juxtaposition of moral monarchy and “bad” politicians has continued to characterise debates 
about representation until the present day. 
 
Challenging Thai-style representation 
 
By 1973, the military regime that Sarit established had been in power for almost 12 
years. Aside from the CPT, the main challenge to this long period of military-monarchy rule 
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came in the early 1970s, from academics and students. Following a gradual build-up of 
student activism, in October 1973, the spark for massive demonstrations was the arrest of 
twelve activists for producing and distributing leaflets demanding that a constitution be 
drafted and enacted. With the detainees accused of attempting to overthrow the government, 
student demonstrations of support soon mushroomed into a broad movement against the 
military dictatorship (Prajak, 2005). The military leaders were sent into exile after massive 
demonstrations and the king separated himself from the unpopular regime. In the moment of 
political vacuum, it was the king who seized the political initiative and managed a transfer of 
power to an electoral regime. The king was able to do this by (briefly and belatedly) by 
separating himself from the military, declaring and demonstrating his “moral superiority” and 
ejecting the military dictators (Handley, 2006: 194-213). 
The sudden release from the repression of years of military rule and the rapid changes 
taking place in Southeast Asia as the Vietnam War ended resulted in an efflorescence of 
protest and multiple challenges to the regime and royalist elite. Electoral politics bloomed, 
with 46 parties standing candidates and 22 of them winning seats in the 1975 election, 
resulting in an unstable multi-party centre-right coalition government. Political conflict 
increased, and as strikes, leftist ideology and peasant resistance became more widespread, the 
monarchy-military alliance was quickly re-energised. The king, fearful of left-wing activism 
and the advent of communism on Thailand’s borders, abandoned his dalliance with electoral 
politics and supported military and other royalist and right-wing groups who engaged in a 
widespread campaign of political repression and assassination (Pasuk and Baker, 1995: 306-
311). Parliament and political parties were ineffective and largely ignored as politics became 
increasingly violent, and an early election in April 1976 produced another ineffective 
coalition. The political situation quickly deteriorated, leading to a massacre of university 
students by royalists, police and rightists, followed by a military coup on 6 October 1976. 
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Close to the king, the new royalist prime minister declared that there would be no return to 
electoral politics for at least 12 years. While he was ousted in another military coup in 1977, 
and there were elections in 1979, 1983 and 1986, these were of little consequence as the 
military continued to control the premiership. For the period from 1980 to 1988, the 
unelected royalist General Prem Tinsulanonda was prime minister and he and the military 
controlled the appointed Senate. In these circumstances, the electorate voted for members of 
political parties who sat in the House of Representatives, but this chamber had virtually no 
impact on policy or on the course of politics (Hicken, 2004). Even when Prem was moved 
aside, the military was able to conduct another coup in 1991, eliminating yet another elected 
government that it accused of corruption. 
As had become the pattern, the coup resulted in a new constitution, supported by the 
king, and the military set about entrenching its control of politics (Handley, 2006: 342-5). Yet 
it was this coup, and especially the May 1992 civilian uprising against the military’s attempt 
to enhance its control, that saw the military disgraced and a renewed effort to establish 
electoral democracy. With the military pushed aside, a long process of constitutional drafting 
began. It was not until the advent of the Asian Financial Crisis that the parliament adopted 
the reformist constitution. The 1997 charter was the first to involve wide consultation, and 
took seriously issues of human rights, decentralization and the establishment of checks-and-
balances it remained an elite-dominated political outcome. It was meant to establish a more 
stable electoral politics by making the executive stronger and by establishing a greater degree 
on party control over MPs. The aim was to prevent “party-hopping” by MPs and to combat 
“money politics” which saw politicians using ill-gotten funds to buy votes and even the 
support of parliamentarians (MPs) in elections and “revolving-door” coalition governments. 
The aim was to establish a stable party system, a strong executive and, in a tilt to the royalist 
12 
 
ideological position, set up institutions to maintain appropriate checks and balances over 
politicians (Harding and Leyland, 2011: 21-6).  
The first election under the 1997 charter were held in early 2001 and resulted in a 
convincing victory for Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party. After serving a full term, 
Thaksin and his party were re-elected in a landslide victory in 2005. Ironically, Thaksin was 
to be the only premier elected under the 1997 constitution. 
That constitution was thrown out by the military in 2006, with strong support from the 
palace, and the 2007 constitution was drawn up with military tutelage. It was meant to 
prevent any Thaksin-like domination of electoral politics. It also increased the power and 
reach of the judiciary and other check-and-balance institutions. However, as pro-Thaksin 
parties continued to win substantial election victories, in 2007 and 2011, in May 2014, the 
military threw out the 2007 constitution. 
 
Street protests and representation 
 
Both the 2006 and 2014 putsches were preceded by months of street protest against 
Thaksin and then pro-Thaksin governments. In 2006, the anti-Thaksin protests were led by 
the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a loose alliance of civil society, businesses, elite 
and royalist groups that opposed the parliamentary power of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party. 
Following the 2006 coup, PAD disbanded, only to return in 2008 to oppose the pro-Thaksin 
government that had won the 2007 election. When that government was ousted by a judicial 
intervention in December 2008, PAD dissolved into several groups promoting ultra-royalism, 
ultra-nationalism and opposition to Thaksin. One aspect of its rhetoric was its growing 
opposition to representative and electoral politics. Following yet another election victory by a 
pro-Thaksin party in 2011, PAD’s remnants joined with several other anti-Thaksin and 
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royalist groups to become the anti-democratic “People's Committee for Absolute Democracy 
with the King as Head of State.” PCAD’s street protests continued a rhetoric that opposed 
electoral politics and paved the way for the May 2014 coup. 
These royalist protest groups were opposed by the pro-Thaksin “red shirts,” associated 
with the “United Democratic Front Against Dictatorship” (UDD). The UDD initially 
organised after the 2006 coup and in opposition to the military-backed constitutional 
referendum in 2007. In its rallies it opposed the military, elite interference in politics and for 
electoral politics while also supporting Thaksin. Red shirt demonstration in 2009 and 2010 
resulted in the army being used to defeat them, resulting in considerable loss of life and 
injuries. 
Thailand’s decade of street protest has sometimes been portrayed as a tussle of 
competing elites, with a rising elite, associated with Thaksin, challenging the long-dominant 
conservative elite of palace-connected military leaders, big business/old money and 
technocrats (Hewison, 2008: 205-7). There was an element of this in the early period of 
disputation. However, as the conflict deepened, there has been society-wide mobilization and 
political polarization. Remarkably, some eight decades after the People’s Party took power, 
this conflict centred on political discourses that pitted those promoting the monarchy and 
Thai-style democracy against others who opposed the royalist’s political dominance and 
demanded that electoral politics be accepted and strengthened. 
The PCAD’s mobilisations in 2014 had several consistent and inter-related themes: 
anti-corruption, protection of the monarchy, and a rejection of electoral democracy. Anti-
corruption was especially attractive for Bangkok’s middle class which was accepting of the 
royalist ideological weaving together of arguments that civilian politicians are corrupt, 
gaining election through “policy corruption” or “money politics,” using the electoral system 
to maintain their power. Politicians were untrustworthy, voters are bought, duped or ignorant, 
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and so electoral politics is the core of the corruption problem. As noted above, in this 
discourse, the monarchy was considered essential for moderating these allegedly corrupt 
politicians (Thongchai, 2008). That there is a corruption problem in Thailand is not contested. 
However, the almost exclusive linking of this with civilian and elected politicians is as part of 
the royalist denigration and rejection of electoral politics. That the business class, military, 
police and the bureaucracy have long been demonstrated to engage in corrupt activities seems 
to matter little in this political discourse (Pasuk and Sungsidh, 1999). 
The second theme – protecting the monarchy – is dated to Sarit’s coup. As noted above, 
Sarit re-invented a relationship between the monarchy and military that saw the latter base its 
legitimacy on the king as the monarchy was positioned as central for the authoritarian rule of 
the military and Thai-style democracy. Royalist governments since 1976 have re-energised 
the lèse-majesté law. That law has been repeatedly used against political opponents as a 
means of silencing criticism. Indeed, following the 2006 coup, when the military-backed 
government defined the monarchy as an element of national security, lèse-majesté repression 
has expanded exponentially. Under Thailand’s Penal Code, lèse majesté is now considered an 
offence against national security (Sinfah and Mendel 2010). By the time that anti-Thaksin 
street demonstrations began in early 2006, PAD made its protests a royalist revolt against 
Thaksin’s “parliamentary dictatorship” (Pye and Schaffer, 2008). Pro-royal symbolism was 
central to PAD’s fight against Thaksin, who was not just identified as a corrupt politician but 
as a leader who was disloyal to the throne. In terms of Thai-style democracy, Thaksin was 
accused of having strayed beyond accepted boundaries. PAD’s decision to beseech the 
monarch to intervene and unseat Thaksin, while ultimately rejected by the king, was critical 
in setting the path towards the palace’s co-operation with the military in the 2006 coup 
(Connors, 2008, Connors and Hewison, 2008). When anti-Thaksin and royalist groups once 
more coagulated as the anti-democratic “People's Committee for Absolute Democracy with 
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the King as Head of State” in 2014, its name conveyed the notion that the political contest 
was of moral royalists opposed to corrupt, elected politicians. 
The third theme of rejecting electoral democracy became significant for street 
demonstrators in 2006, when PAD’s activism against Thaksin as anti-democratic was 
overtaken by its pleas for royal political intervention. As Pye and Schaffer (2008: 55) make 
clear, while there was “some discussion of the option of direct democracy and of ‘people’s 
power,’ this remained a minority position within the movement…”. After the 2006 coup 
failed to change the political system in ways that prevented pro-Thaksin parties winning 
elections, PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul railed against electoral politics as “corrupt,” 
declaring: “Representative democracy is not suitable for Thailand” (Newsweek, 5 September 
2008). PAD’s leaders created a political party and made a call for a “new politics” that sought 
a “clean” politics and rejected electoral democracy. Another leader said PAD wanted an 
electoral system in which less than a third of the lower house was to be elected, with the rest 
being appointed by the educated “great and good.” This proposal was to prevent election 
victories where the “uneducated poor” were repeatedly duped by “corrupt politicians” (The 
Guardian, 3 December 2008). This call matched claims by royalist ideologues like Prawase 
Wasi who, following the 2006 coup, declared that “society had to admit that politicians – 
who are elected to represent the people – create problems,” and called for restrictions on the 
political and policy roles of elected politicians (Nation, 29 November 2006). Later, in 
September 2008, he declared that the parliamentary system was “not true democracy but 
dictatorship,” and because it was “under the command of an individual person [Thaksin], the 
parliamentary system is no solution” (cited in Nelson, 2010: 121). 
Such anti-liberal and anti-democratic views were widely held amongst those who made 
up the various groups opposed to Thaksin. Those who voted for pro-Thaksin parties were 
declared ignorant and bought and admonished as dumb “red buffalo.” The image was of red 
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shirts being led by the nose to vote and to rally by the “populist” Thaksin. The image of the 
“red buffalo” has been a staple of royalist ASTV/Manager cartoons that denigrate voters and 
voting (see 2bangkok.com, 2012). When the PCAD was on the streets from late 2013, led by 
senior figures from the opposition Democrat Party, it also campaigned against elections, 
referring to a “parliamentary dictatorship” and “majoritarianism.” This anti-election language 
was combined with attacks on voters, a campaign to block candidate registration, prevent the 
distribution of ballots and a violent boycott of elections. PCAD made repeated claims that 
elected politicians were the root cause of Thailand’s political crisis. 
PCAD street protesters rejected electoral democracy as distorted and not “real” 
democracy. PCAD argued that no election could be “free and fair” until the “Thaksin regime” 
had been destroyed. Their ultimatum was that the Yingluck government should be thrown 
out, replaced by an appointed government and an appointed reform committee to ensure the 
Thaksin regime uprooted. It was argued that elections are just one aspect of democracy and 
that pro-Thaksin governments engaged in “majoritarianism,” riding rough-shod over the 
minority that did not vote for the pro-Thaksin party. Electoral majorities were swept aside in 
the anti-democratic rhetoric. 
Both PAD and the PCAD, dominated by the Bangkok-based elite and middle class, 
have campaigned for a “democracy” that places greater reliance on selected and appointed 
“representatives,” usually opting for ministers or a royally-appointed “national government.” 
Such calls fit well with the royalist elite’s proposals for Thai-style democracy. The 
paternalism of this approach was evident when the military took power in May 2014. The 
junta’s Orwellian doublespeak saw the coup defined as an act to strengthen “democracy”: 
 
[the] NCPO [the military junta] and all Thai citizens uphold and have faith in the 
democratic system with His Majesty the King as Head of State. [The] NCPO fully 
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realizes that the military intervention may be perceived by the West as a threat to 
democracy and a violation of the people’s liberty. However, this military intervention 
was inevitable, in order to uphold national security and to strengthen democracy 
(Government Public Relations Department, 2014, emphasis added). 
 
This manipulation of governance symbols had previously taken up by PCAD protesters who 
trumpeted transparency and anti-corruption, defining “true” democracy as an opposition to 
elections. 
Those on the other side of this struggle also championed democracy, but made a far 
simpler argument that had its roots in 1932. The principles of the United Front for 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), the official red shirt movement, stated, inter alia, 
that the UDD sought to “attain true democracy with sovereignty truly in the hands of the 
people of Thailand with the King as the head of state.”2 It also made the point that the UDD 
was a grassroots movement seeking “democracy and justice while resisting ‘aristocratic’ 
forces that obstructs equitable and democratic national development” (UDD, n.d.; see also 
UDD, 2010). As well as restating the principle of sovereignty being with the people, red 
shirts observed that winning several elections should count for something. In contrast to the 
PCAD, they asserted that political reform should take place within an electoral democracy 
rather than be imposed by an unelected and unrepresentative body. They asserted that there 
could be no democracy without voting. They pointed out that the repeated overturning of 
some very substantial election victories was as an affront to democratic politics and devalued 
their votes. 
                                                 
2 The statement included the words “king as head of state” was required for two reasons. First, to reduce claims 
that the UDD was “disloyal”; and second for constitutional reasons as Section 68 of the 2007 constitution made 
it illegal to propose a form of government other than “the democratic regime of government with the King as 
Head of State…” (Government of Thailand, 2007: section 68). 
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By 2014, it was the anti-democratic discourse that devalued votes and voters had 
gained the political ascendency, with the military coup. The military junta has declared that 
sovereignty is with the monarch rather than the people or parliament: 
 
In the name of His Majesty the King who presented his royal power to us, today who 
among us thinks of this? From the point of view of the government, you are using the 
three powers [ie. legislative, executive and judicial power] which belong to Him. The 
power does not belong to you. You do not receive this power when you are elected. It 
is power that comes from His Majesty the King. His Majesty presented this power to 
us to form the government. Today, the power that I have was presented to me by the 
King (General Prayuth Chan-ocha, cited in Jory, 2014: 2). 
 
Prayuth was speaking to an appointed assembly, yet his claim that sovereignty was with the 
monarch amounted to a rejection of the popular sovereignty asserted by the People’s Party in 
1932 when it proclaimed: “You, all of the people, should know that our country belongs to 
the people – not to the king…”. In 2014, the military-palace alliance felt confident in 
rejecting the proclamation of popular sovereignty that had underpinned notions of 
representation for eight decades. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thailand’s seemingly non-stop street protests came to an end with the 2014 military 
coup, the second military intervention in a decade. A military coup is not an unusual event for 
Thailand yet this putsch was avowedly royalist and its leaders have rejected the practices of 
electoral politics of the period since the 1997 constitution. More radically, the military 
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leaders have declared that they will rewrite the rules of politics through hand-picked 
assemblies dominated by military and police generals. The blueprint for this radical 
programme is Thai-style democracy, a royalist rejection of notions of popular sovereignty 
and representation. As in the past, the triumph of this reactionary political ideology will be 
challenged by popular agitation against royalist and military domination and against 
restrictions that limit rights, representation and democratic decision-making. 
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